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Abstract
This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of different types of
goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. We seek to design the payment
rules and conditions under which coalitions of participants cannot influence the auction outcome
in order to obtain higher collective utility. Under the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves mechanism, coalition-proof outcomes are achieved if the submitted bids are convex and
the constraint sets are of a polymatroid-type. These conditions, however, do not capture the
complexity of the general class of reverse auctions under consideration. By relaxing the property
of incentive-compatibility, we investigate further payment rules that are coalition-proof with-
out any extra conditions on the submitted bids and the constraint sets. Since calculating the
payments directly for these mechanisms is computationally difficult for auctions involving many
participants, we present two computationally efficient methods. Our results are verified with
several case studies based on electricity market data.
1 Introduction
Auctions are effective for allocating resources and determining their values among a set of partici-
pants. In an auction, participants submit their valuations of the resources (bids), and then a central
operator determines the allocation and the payment for each participant as specified by the auction
mechanism. Recently, there has been a surge of interest from the control community to explore
auction mechanisms because of their applications in several problems, such as coordinating electric
vehicle charging [1], telecommunication and power networks [2], demand response management [3],
provisioning of a distributed database [4], and selecting a host for a noxious resource (e.g., trash
disposal facility) [5]. The central element in any mechanism is the design of the payment and allo-
cation rules, since the participants have incentives to strategize around these rules. In particular,
the central operator designs the payment rule to ensure an efficient outcome, that is, an outcome
maximizing social welfare. This goal is best achieved by solving for the optimal allocation under
the condition that the participants submitted their true valuations.
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In this paper, we consider mechanism design for reverse auctions that may involve continuous
values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. This is
motivated by the fact that several current energy market problems can be cast within this general
class of auctions [6–8]. Previous work on these markets considers the pay-as-bid mechanism [9]
and the locational marginal pricing mechanism [10, 11]. In both mechanisms, participants can bid
strategically to influence their payoff since these mechanisms do not incentivize truthful bidding.
As an alternative, we analyze the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, which has several the-
oretical virtues [12–14]. In particular, unlike many other mechanisms, under the VCG mechanism,
every participant finds it more profitable to bid truthfully regardless of the bids of the others.
Hence, truthful bidding is the dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium, and we refer to this property
as incentive-compatibility. Due to this property, several recent works propose the use of the VCG
mechanism [15–17].
Despite the desirable theoretical properties of the VCG mechanism, in practice, this mechanism
is often deemed undesirable since coalitions of participants can strategically bid to increase their
collective utility. Consequently, it is susceptible to different kinds of manipulations, such as collusion
and shill bidding [18]. These shortcomings are decisive in practicality of the VCG mechanism since
in a larger context the VCG mechanism is not truthful. As a result, practical applications of the
VCG mechanism in real commerce are rare at best [18,19].
As is outlined in combinatorial auction literature [18], the shortcomings described above occur
when the VCG utilities are not in the core. The core is a concept from coalitional game theory
where the participants have no incentives to leave the grand coalition, that is, the coalition of all
participants [20]. Recently, coalitional game theory has received attention, especially for aggre-
gating power generators [21], and deriving control policies for multi-agent systems [22]. In this
paper, we use coalitional game theory to ensure that the VCG mechanism is coalition-proof, in
other words, collusion and shill bidding are not profitable. To this end, we derive conditions on
the submitted bids and the constraint sets that ensure core VCG utilities by utilizing some recent
advances from combinatorial optimization. We show that under convex (or marginally increasing)
bids and polymatroid-type constraints the VCG mechanism is coalition-proof.
The restricted market setting for core VCG utilities, however, does not capture the complexity
of general reverse auctions arising in electricity markets. Specifically, these markets may involve
nonconvex bids (e.g., generator startup costs [15]), and complex constraint sets that are not poly-
matroids (e.g., DC or AC optimal power flow constraints [10]). Hence, it may not be possible to
ensure core VCG utilities. To this end, we focus on payment rules that are coalition-proof with-
out any extra conditions on the bids and the constraints. In particular, we show that selecting
the payments from the core yields this desirable property. Naturally, these mechanisms relax the
incentive-compatibility of the VCG mechanism. In order to alleviate this issue and incentivize
truthfulness, we minimize the participants’ abilities to benefit from strategic manipulation among
all other coalition-proof mechanisms. Variants of these mechanisms are implemented in high-stakes
auctions for selling spectrum licenses in the United Kingdom and Switzerland [23–26]. However,
these studies are limited to the forward combinatorial auctions. We extend these studies to reverse
auctions with potentially continuous values of goods, second stage costs, and general constraints.
Let us contrast our work with existing mechanism design research. The authors in [27] design
a forward VCG auction for continuous goods by restricting each participant to submitting a single
price-quantity pair to the operator. They show that this mechanism, called progressive second price
(PSP) mechanism, has a truthful -Nash equilibrium, which can be attained by best-response dy-
namics. The work in [28] studies the PSP mechanism subject to quantized pricing assumptions, and
proposes a fast algorithm converging to a quantized Nash equilibrium with a high probability. More
recently, the work in [1] addresses cross-elasticity in PSP design arising from having a multi-period
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problem for charging electric vehicles. This work is generalized to decentralized procedures and
double-sided auctions in [2]. In regard to these studies, the PSP mechanism cannot be implemented
in dominant-strategies, and truthfulness is only in the price dimension for a given quantity. Specif-
ically, in the PSP mechanism, there is no single true quantity to declare, and the optimal quantity
depends on the bids of other participants [27, §3.2]. Moreover, the convergence analysis of the best
response dynamics is limited to strongly concave true valuations and simple market constraints, for
example, availability of a fixed amount of a single continuous good [27, §3.1]. On the other hand,
the work in [15] applies the VCG mechanism to the wholesale electricity markets and shows that it
results in larger payments than the locational marginal pricing mechanism. Nevertheless, none of
the aforementioned works consider coalitional manipulations. Finally, the works in [29–31] study
the design of the participants’ utilities such that the selfish behavior of the participants results in a
social welfare maximizing outcome. By contrast, in our case, the true valuations of the participants
are a priori unknown and they are not part of the design. Instead, we are guiding the participants
to a social welfare maximizing outcome by designing meaningful incentives through the payment
rule.
Our contributions in the paper are as follows. First, we prove that in the reverse auctions over
continuous goods the VCG mechanism is coalition-proof and the VCG utilities lie in the core, if
and only if the market objective function is supermodular, see Theorems 2 and 3. These results
are direct extensions of the results from the multiple item setting. Second, considering the special
setting of continuous goods and complex constraints, we derive novel conditions on the bids and the
constraint sets under which the VCG mechanism is coalition-proof, see Theorems 4 and 5. Third, in
Theorem 6, we show that in the reverse auctions over continuous goods selecting payments from the
core results in a coalition-proof mechanism without any restrictions on the bids and the constraints,
extending results from the multiple item setting. Finally, we address the computational difficulties
of these mechanisms by providing two efficient methods.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a constrained
optimization problem that models a general class of reverse auctions. Then, we introduce the VCG
mechanism and illustrate that coalitions of participants can influence the outcome. For an analysis
of this shortcoming, in Section 3 we bring in tools from coalitional game theory, namely the core, in
which the participants do not have incentives to leave the grand coalition. Throughout this section,
we investigate conditions under which the VCG mechanism is coalition-proof. Since these conditions
do not capture the complexity of the general class of reverse auctions, alternative payment rules are
proposed in Section 4. In Section 5, we present several case studies based on real-world electricity
market data to illustrate the conditions we derived and the proposed payment rules.
2 Mechanism Framework
We start with a generic reverse auction model. The set of auction participants consists of the central
operator l = 0 and the bidders l ∈ L, where L = {1, . . . , |L|}. Let t be the number of types of goods
in the reverse auction. Goods of the same type from different bidders are fungible to the central
operator. Each bidder l has a private true cost function cl : Rt+ → R+ which is nondecreasing.
We further assume that cl(0) = 0. This assumption holds for many existing reverse auctions, for
instance, control reserve markets and day-ahead electricity markets that include generators’ start-
up costs [6, 15]. Each bidder l then submits a bid function to the central operator, denoted by
bl : Rt+ → R+ and nondecreasing with bl(0) = 0.
Given the bid profile B = {bl}l∈L, a mechanism defines an allocation rule x∗l (B) ∈ Rt+ and a
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payment rule pl(B) ∈ R for each bidder l. The central operator’s objective is
J¯(x, y;B) =
∑
l∈L
bl(xl) + d(x, y).
Here y ∈ Rp are additional variables entering the central operator’s optimization, in addition to
the allocation x ∈ Rt|L|. The function d : Rt|L|+ × Rp → R is an additional cost term. For example,
in a two-stage auction model, the operator can buy the goods from another market. In this case,
y corresponds to the second stage variables and the function d is the second stage cost [6]. In
Section 5, we provide a real-world electricity market example where the function d incorporates
expected daily market prices in a weekly market.
In most auction mechanisms, the allocation is determined by minimizing the central operator’s
objective subject to some market constraints
J(B) = min
x,y
J¯(x, y;B) s.t. g(x, y) ≤ 0, (1)
where g : Rt|L|+ × Rp → Rq defines the constraints. (If the above optimization problem is infeasible
then the objective value is J(B) =∞.) Let the optimal solution of (1) be denoted by x∗(B) ∈ Rt|L|+
and y∗(B) ∈ Rp. We assume that in case of multiple optima, there is some tie-breaking rule
according to a predetermined fixed ordering of the bidders. The solution of the optimization
problem (1) is the optimal allocation with respect to the submitted bids, that is, the goods are
bought from the bidders with lower bid prices.
The utility of bidder l is given by
ul(B) = pl(B)− cl(x∗l (B)).
A bidder whose bid is not accepted, x∗l (B) = 0, is not paid and ul(B) = 0. The total payment made
by the central operator is given by
u0(B) = −
∑
l∈L
pl(B)− d(x∗(B), y∗(B)),
which can be treated as the utility of the central operator. Note that this payment can be an
expected payment when the function d is an expected second stage cost. As a remark, if the
optimization problem (1) is infeasible, we have u0(B) = −∞.
Constrained optimization problem (1) defines a general class of reverse auction models. Several
current market problems such as stochastic energy market mechanisms [6,7,9,16,32–34] and energy
reserve co-optimized markets [8, 15, 35–39] can be cast within this model.1 The constraints may
correspond to procurement of the required amounts of power supplies, for instance, in the Swiss
control reserve markets accepted reserves must have a deficit probability of less than 0.2%. They
may also correspond to a transmission network, for instance, in energy markets power injections
must satisfy the transmission line limits and the power flow equations.
1Let us contrast our market framework with the one in [40]. The authors in [40] study a single settlement
mechanism for two-stage stochastic markets. These markets include intermittent power generation from renewable
resources such as solar energy and wind. These resources cannot accurately predict the quantity they can produce in
the first stage of the market. These productions are revealed only in real-time. To accurately price such generation,
the mechanism in [40] ties the first stage and the second stage markets together. To this end, the bidders are required
to provide linear bid functions for both stages of the market. The mechanism in [40] then sets prices for both stages
of the market simultaneously. The main difference to our work is that the mechanisms we study distribute payments
only for the first stage of the market. We assume that the settlement of the second stage is separate from that of the
first stage motivated by the markets in [6, 7].
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Three fundamental properties we desire in mechanism design are 1) individual rationality, 2)
efficiency and 3) dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility. A mechanism is individually rational
if the bidders do not face negative utilities, ul(B) ≥ 0, for all l ∈ L. A mechanism is efficient if the
sum of all the utilities
∑|L|
l=0 ul(B) is maximized.
To define the third property, we first bring in tools from game theory. Let B−l be the bid profile
of all the bidders, except bidder l. The bid profile B is a Nash equilibrium if for every bidder l,
ul(Bl,B−l) ≥ ul(B˜l,B−l), ∀B˜l. The bid profile B is a dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium if for every
bidder l, ul(Bl, Bˆ−l) ≥ ul(B˜l, Bˆ−l), ∀B˜l, ∀Bˆ−l. Let the truthful bid profile be C = {cl}l∈L. Then, a
mechanism is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible if the bid profile C is the dominant strategy
Nash equilibrium. In other words, every bidder finds it more profitable to bid truthfully, regardless
of the bids of other participants.
2.1 Currently used payment rules
We introduce two prominent payment rules widely used for the reverse auctions under consideration.
In the pay-as-bid mechanism, the payment rule is pl(B) = bl(x∗l (B)).2 It follows that each
bidder’s utility is ul(B) = bl(x∗l (B))− cl(x∗l (B)). A rational bidder would overbid to ensure positive
utility. Consequently, under the pay-as-bid mechanism, the central operator calculates the optimal
allocation for the inflated bids rather than the true costs. Furthermore, the bidders need to spend
resources to learn how to bid to maximize their utility. There are many Nash equilibria arising
from the pay-as-bid mechanism, none of which are incentive-compatible. This result was previously
shown in our work, see [9].
The locational marginal pricing (LMP) mechanism is adopted in the energy markets where
transmission networks are present. We refer to [10] for an exposition on the calculation of these
payments from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the optimization problem (1). Under this
mechanism, a bidder can manipulate its LMP payment by inflating its bids. As a strategic ma-
nipulation, a bidder may also withhold its maximum supply [42–44]. Similar to the pay-as-bid
mechanism, the bidders need to spend resources to learn how to maximize their utilities. Further-
more, a Nash equilibrium may not exist [45,46].
We see that these payment rules do not satisfy the properties of efficiency or incentive-com-
patibility. Next, we explore the properties of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism.
2.2 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is characterized with the payment rule:
pl(B) = bl(x∗l (B)) + (h(B−l)− J(B)).
The function h(B−l) ∈ R must be chosen carefully to ensure individual rationality. A particular
choice is the Clarke pivot rule h(B−l) = J(B−l), where J(B−l) denotes the minimum total cost
without bidder l, that is, the optimal value of the optimization problem (1) with xl = 0.
3 Note
that this mechanism is well-defined under the assumption that there exists a feasible solution when
a bidder is removed. However, this is not a restrictive assumption in the presence of many bidders
and a second-stage market.
2For instance, several European balancing market are settled under a pay-as-bid mechanism—see [41] and further
references therein.
3In the case of an auction of a single item, the VCG mechanism with the Clarke pivot rule is equivalent to the
second-price (Vickrey) auction.
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For the model introduced in (1), our first result shows that the VCG mechanism first derived
in [12–14] satisfies all three fundamental properties. This result is a straightforward generalization
of the works in [12–14], which do not consider continuous values of goods, second stage costs, and
general constraints.
Theorem 1 Given the market model (1),
(i) The VCG mechanism is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible.
(ii) The VCG mechanism is efficient.
(iii) The VCG mechanism ensures nonnegative payments and individual rationality when the Clarke
pivot rule is utilized, h(B−l) = J(B−l).
The proof is relegated to Appendix A. In summary, all bidders have incentives to reveal their
true costs in a VCG mechanism. Dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility makes it easier for
entities to enter the auction, without spending resources in computing optimal bidding strategies.
This can promote participation in the market. As a remark, Theorem 1-(ii) shows that solving
for the optimal allocation with the true costs yields an efficient mechanism. In the remainder, we
consider the Clarke pivot rule for the VCG mechanism since it ensures individual rationality.
Despite many advantages of the VCG mechanism for the reverse auction model (1), this mech-
anism suffers from collusion and shill bidding [18]. Bidders K ⊆ L are colluders if they obtain
higher collective utility by changing their bids from CK = {cl}l∈K to BK = {bl}l∈K . Bidder l is
a shill bidder if there exists a set S and bids BS = {bk}k∈S such that bidder l finds participating
with bids BS more profitable than participating with a single truthful bid Cl.
To illustrate these issues, we study two energy market examples. For these examples, we consider
the VCG mechanism with the Clark-pivot rule and with d(x, y) ≡ 0 in the central operator’s
objective. Later, we come back to these examples in Section 3, in order to discuss conditions
to eliminate collusion and shill-bidding. First example is a reverse auction of a single type of
power supply. In these markets, each bidder is allowed to submit mutually exclusive bids that can
equivalently be represented as bid curves, see Section 3.1.
Example 1 (Simple Market) Suppose the central operator has to procure 800 MW of power
supply from bidders 1, 2 and 3 who have the true costs $100 for 400 MW, $400 for 400 MW
and $600 for 800 MW, respectively. Under the VCG mechanism, bidders 1 and 2 win and receive
pVCG1 = 100 + (600 − 500) = $200 and pVCG2 = 400 + (600 − 500) = $500. Suppose bidders 1 and
2 collude and change their bids to $0 for 400 MW. Then, bidders 1 and 2 receive a payment of
$600 each for the same allocation. In fact, bidders 1 and 2 could represent multiple identities of a
single losing bidder (that is, a bidder with the true cost greater than $600 for 800 MW). Entering
the market with two shill bids, this bidder receives a payment of 2× $600 for 800 MW.
Second example is a power market where the operator is procuring a set of different types of
power supplies.
Example 2 (Power Market) We consider a reverse auction with three different types of supplies,
types A, B and C. Here, type A can replace types B and C simultaneously.4 Suppose the central
operator has to procure 100 MW of type B and 100 MW of type C (or equivalently only 100 MW
of type A) from bidders 1 to 5. Truthful bid profiles of 5 bidders are provided in Table 1.
4This is an abstraction for power reserve markets where secondary reserves can replace both negative and positive
tertiary reserves simultaneously [6].
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Table 1: Bid profile in the Power Market
Bidders (Types) 1 (A) 2 (B) 3 (B) 4 (C) 5 (C)
MW 100 100 100 100 100
$ 500 350 400 250 400
Constraint set in (1) is given by{
x ∈ {0, 100}5 |x1 + x2 + x3 ≥M({A,B}) = 100,
x1 + x4 + x5 ≥M({A,C}) = 100
}
.
(2)
Under the VCG mechanism, bidder 1 wins and receives pVCG1 = 500 + (600− 500) = $600. Suppose
losing bidders 2 and 4 collude and change their bid prices to $0. Then, bidders 2 and 4 receive $400
each and they obtain a collective VCG profit of $200. Total payment of the operator increases from
$600 to $800. This is unfair towards bidder 1 who is willing to offer the same supply for $500.
It is troubling that the VCG mechanism can result in large payments through coalitional ma-
nipulations. In all these examples, there exists a group of bidders who is willing to offer the same
amount of good by receiving less payment. From the central operator’s perspective, the operator
would instead want to renegotiate the payments with a subset of participants.
Next, we define the desirable auction outcomes as the coalition-proof outcomes. By coalition-
proof, we mean that a group of bidders who lose when bidding their true cost, cannot profit by
a joint deviation, and a bidder cannot profit from bidding with multiple identities. Consequently,
auctions with coalition-proof outcomes are immune to collusion and shill bidding, and they would
avoid large payments through coalitional manipulations. We remark that it is not possible to expect
being fully immune to collusion from all sets of bidders. For instance, no mechanism can eliminate
the case where all bidders inflate their bid prices simultaneously, see also the examples in [47].
Hence, we concentrate our efforts on eliminating collusion from the bidders who lose when bidding
truthfully.
3 Ensuring Coalition-Proof VCG Outcomes
In coalitional game theory, the core defines the set of utility allocations that cannot be improved
upon by forming coalitions.5 Here, we show that if the VCG outcome lies in the core, then the
VCG mechanism eliminates any incentives for collusion and shill bidding. Keeping this in mind,
our goal is to derive sufficient conditions to ensure that the VCG outcome lies in the core, and
hence the VCG mechanism is coalition-proof.
For every S ⊆ L, let J(BS) be the objective function under any set of bids BS = {bl}l∈S from
the coalition S. It is defined by the following expression:
J(BS) = min
x,y
∑
l∈S
bl(xl) + d(x, y)
s.t. g(x, y) ≤ 0, x−S = 0,
(3)
5Throughout the paper, we use the term utility allocation and the auction outcome interchangeably.
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where the stacked vector x−S ∈ Rt(|L|−|S|)+ is defined by omitting the subvectors from the set S.
Note that this function is nonincreasing, that is, J(BR) ≥ J(BS) for R ⊆ S.6
Next, we define the core with respect to the truthful bids, CR = {cl}l∈R, and refer to this
definition solely as the core.
Definition 1 For every set of bidders R ⊆ L, the core Core(CR) ∈ R× R|R|+ is defined as follows
Core(CR) =
{
u ∈ R× R|R|+ |u0 +
∑
l∈R
ul = −J(CR), u0 +
∑
l∈S
ul ≥ −J(CS), ∀S ⊂ R
}
. (4)
Note that there are 2|R| linear constraints that define a utility allocation in the core for the set of
bidders R. The core is always nonempty in an auction because the utility allocation u0 = −J(CR)
and ul = 0 for all l ∈ R always lies in the core. This allocation corresponds to the utility allocation
of the pay-as-bid mechanism under the truthful bidding CR.
For the mechanism design, we highlight the implications of the constraints in (4). Restricting
the utility allocation to the nonnegative orthant yields the individual rationality property for the
bidders. The equality constraint implies that the mechanism is efficient, since the term on the right
is maximized by the optimal allocation. We say that a utility allocation is unblocked if there is
no set of bidders that could make a deal with the operator from which every member can benefit,
including the operator. This condition is satisfied by the inequality constraints.
The VCG outcome attains the maximal utility in the core for every bidder. Note that under the
VCG mechanism each bidder’s utility is given by uVCGl = J(C−l)− J(C). Then, for every bidder l,
uVCGl = max {ul |u ∈ Core(C)}, see [9, 48]. In general, this maximal point may not lie in the core.
The following example gives visual insight about the core in terms of payments and illustrates the
dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium of the VCG mechanism corresponding to Example 1. In this
example, shill bidding and collusion are profitable under the VCG mechanism.
Example 3 We revisit Example 1. Without loss of generality, assume that in case of a tie the
central operator prefers bidders 1 and 2 over bidder 3. We can visualize the core outcomes for the
bidders 1 and 2 by removing the losing bidder 3, pVCG3 = 0, and the operator. Core outcomes and
the VCG payments (pVCGi ) are given in Figure 1.
Considering that the core will characterize coalition-proof outcomes, we are ready to investigate
the conditions under which the VCG outcome lies in the core. To this end, we provide three sufficient
conditions that ensure core VCG outcomes for the auction model (1). Notice that there are 2|L|
linear core constraints in Core(C), see (4). First, we derive the following equivalent characterization
with significantly lower number of constraints.
Lemma 1 Let W ⊆ L be the winners of the reverse auction (1) for the set of bidders L, that is,
each bidder l ∈ W is allocated a positive quantity. Let u ∈ R × R|L|+ be the corresponding utility
allocation. Then, u ∈ Core(C) if and only if u0 = −J(C)−
∑
l∈L ul and∑
l∈K
ul ≤ J(C−K)− J(C), ∀K ⊆W. (5)
The proof is relegated to Appendix B. The following proposition is our first sufficient condition
for core VCG outcomes.
6This holds since bl(0) = 0 for all l ∈ L.
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p1
p2
100 200 600
400
500
600
p1 + p2 ≤ $600
p2 ≥ $400
p1 ≥ $100
(pVCG1 , p
VCG
2 )
•
•
Pareto optimal frontier of the core
CorePay-as-bid
under truthful bidding
Figure 1: Core outcomes and the VCG payments under truthful bidding
Proposition 1 The VCG outcome is in the core, uVCG ∈ Core(C), if the market in (1) is infeasible
whenever any two winners l1, l2 ∈W are removed from the set of bidders L.
Proof Notice that if the optimization problem (1) is infeasible then the objective value is J(B) =∞.
Given this property of the market, inequality constraints (5) in Lemma 1 simplify to constraints on
the utilities of single bidders, that is, uVCGl ≤ J(C−l)− J(C), for all l ∈W . This inequality follows
directly from the definition of the VCG utility, uVCGl = J(C−l) − J(C), for all l ∈ W . Equality
constraint in Lemma 1 is satisfied by definition. 
The above condition can only be present in some specialized instances of reverse auctions.
It is not possible in general to guarantee that this condition will hold in a market by enforcing
restrictions on the bidders and the market model.
We soon show that supermodularity provides an equivalent condition for core VCG outcomes.
Definition 2 A function f : 2L → R is supermodular if
f(S)− f(S−l) ≤ f(R)− f(R−l),
for all S ⊆ R ⊆ L and for all l ∈ S. Or, equivalently, for all S,R ⊆ L, f(S ∪ R) + f(S ∩ R) ≥
f(S) + f(R) must hold. A function f : 2L → R is submodular if −f is supermodular. Furthermore,
a function is nondecreasing if f(S′) ≤ f(S), for all S′ ⊆ S.
For the remainder, the objective function J in (3) is said to be supermodular if supermodularity
condition holds under any bid profile. Our main result of this section proves that supermodularity
of the objective function is necessary and sufficient for ensuring core VCG outcomes.
Theorem 2 For any bid profile C and for any set of participating auction bidders R ⊆ L, the
outcome of the VCG mechanism is in the core, if and only if the objective function J in (3) is
supermodular.
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Note that a similar result was proven in [18], for a forward auction of a finite number of items
without any other constraints. Our result generalizes this proof to reverse auctions with continuous
goods and arbitrary central operator objectives and constraints as modeled in (1). The proof
developed also significantly simplifies the arguments in [18]. The proof is relegated to Appendix C.
As previously anticipated, we now prove that core outcomes, hence the supermodularity condi-
tion, makes collusion and shill bidding unprofitable in a VCG mechanism.
Theorem 3 For the set of bidders L, consider a VCG auction mechanism modeled by (1). If the
objective function J is supermodular, then,
(i) A group of bidders who lose when bidding their true values cannot profit by a joint deviation.
(ii) Bidding with multiple identities is unprofitable for any bidder.
The proof is relegated to Appendix D. Theorem 3 shows that if the operator has a supermod-
ular objective (or equivalently, if the VCG outcomes are in the core), then the VCG mechanism is
coalition-proof. Given this result, we next investigate sufficient conditions on the bids and the con-
straint sets in order to ensure supermodularity and thus coalition-proof outcomes. In the following
we derive conditions for two classes of markets.
3.1 Markets for a single type of good
We start by considering simpler reverse auctions where the operator has to procure a fixed amount
M of a single type of good. Each bidder l has a private true cost function cl : R+ → R+ that
is nondecreasing with cl(0) = 0. These types of auctions are mainly characterized by single-stage
decisions with mutually exclusive bids. This means that a bidder can offer a set of bids, of which
only one can be accepted. We first show that such discrete bids fit into our model (1). Here,
bidder l submits truthful bids for nl discrete amounts as {(cl,i, xl,i)}nli=1 where cl,i ∈ R+ and the
amounts offered by each bidder xl,i ∈ R+ must be equally spaced by some increment m which is a
divisor of M , that is,
xl,i = im, for some i ∈ Z+. (6)
Note that, there is an equivalent representation of the form cl(x) ∈ R+ for x > 0 as follows:
cl(x) = min
i=1,...,nl
{cl,i |xl,i ≥ x} , (7)
where cl(0) = 0. This form equivalently represents that all the amounts up to the size of the winning
bid are available to the operator. Furthermore, bid prices of this form are piecewise constant and
continuous from the left.
We consider auctions cleared by
J(CS) = min
x∈R|S|+
∑
l∈S
cl(xl)
s.t.
∑
l∈S
xl ≥M,
(8)
for S ⊆ L. Note, we can equivalently assume that xl, above, takes values in {xl,i | i ∈ Z+} ⊆ R+
(cf. (7) and Figure 2) and doing so, we let x∗ = {x∗l }l∈S be the optimal values in these sets.
The model (8) is within the auction model (1). We can now derive conditions on bidders’ true
costs to ensure supermodularity of J . Thus, we derive conditions under which the VCG outcome
from (8) would lie in the core.
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Figure 2: Marginally increasing piecewise constant bid prices
Theorem 4 Given (6), if the true costs are marginally increasing, namely, xl,b − xl,a = xl,d − xl,c
implies that cl,b − cl,a < cl,d − cl,c for each bidder l ∈ L and for each 0 ≤ xl,a < xl,c < xl,d, then the
objective function J is supermodular.
This setting includes reverse auctions of multiple identical items as a subset. However, we
highlight that our proof does not share any similarities with that of [18], which achieves submodular
objective functions in forward combinatorial auctions. Our proof relies on an important lemma we
prove showing that the allocations of every bidder is nondecreasing when a bidder is removed from
the auction (8). The proof is relegated to Appendix E. As a corollary of this result, marginally
increasing costs imply coalition-proof VCG outcomes for (8) and thus eliminate incentives for
collusion and shill bidding. This condition is visualized in Figure 2.
We note that the analogue of Theorem 4 holds for continuous bids and for strictly convex bid
curves. This could also be seen as the limiting case, by taking the limit where the incerement m
goes to 0.
We illustrate the conditions in Theorem 4 by revisiting Example 1 from Section 2.
Example 4 (Simple Market) Revisiting Example 1 and Example 3, we observe that the bid from
bidder 3 does not satisfy the conditions in Theorem 4, because the bid price for 400 MW is not
submitted. Assume instead bidder 3 provides the mutually exclusive bids of $300 for 400 MW and
$600 for 800 MW. Suppose bidders 1 and 2 change their bids to $0 for 400 MW. Then, bidders 1
and 2 are the winners and each receives a payment of $300. If they were multiple identities of a
single bidder, after shill bidding, sum of their payments would decrease from $700 to $600.
Next, we consider a more general setting with different types of goods where it is still possible
to derive conditions to ensure supermodularity and coalition-proof VCG outcomes.
11
3.2 Markets for different types of goods
We now consider reverse auctions where the central operator is procuring a set of different types
of goods. Each bidder has a private true cost function c : Rt+ → R+ that is nondecreasing with
c(0) = 0. We assume that this cost has an additive from, c(x) =
∑t
τ=1 cτ (xτ ). Typically, in these
markets, bids are submitted separately for each type with an upper-bound on the amount to be
procured, X¯τ ∈ R+ [6]. The operator treats these bids as bids from different identities, and then
distributes the payments accordingly. In this case, the set L is the extended set of bidders such
that the bid profile C is given by the bids of the form cl : R+ → R+, X¯l ∈ R+, for all l ∈ L.
Let [t] = {1, . . . , t}. Define the set {Aτ}tτ=1 to be a partition of the set L where each set Aτ ⊆ L
is the set of bidders submitting a bid for goods of type τ . Specifically, we consider auctions cleared
by the optimization problem:
J(CS) = min
x∈R|L|+
∑
l∈S
cl(xl)
s.t.
∑
l∈AT
xl ≥M(T ), ∀T ⊆ [t],
xl ≤ X¯l, ∀l ∈ L,
xl = 0, ∀l ∈ L \ S,
(9)
where AT =
⋃
τ∈T A
τ . We minimize the sum of declared costs subject to constraints on the subsets
of types [t]. Here, the function M : 2[t] → R+ defines the amount the operator wants to procure
from possible combinations of different types of goods. We assume that M(∅) = 0 (normalized).
We remark that the optimization problem in (9) contains the case in Example 2.
In the following result we see that if cl and M satisfy convexity and supermodularity conditions
respectively, then J is supermodular.
Theorem 5 The objective function J given by (9) is supermodular when cl is increasing and convex
for all l ∈ L, M is supermodular and nondecreasing.
The proof is relegated to Appendix F, and it builds upon recent advances in polymatroid
optimization.7 As a corollary of this result, the conditions on cl, l ∈ L and M in Theorem 5 imply
core VCG outcomes for (9). The conclusions of Theorem 3 on shill bidding and collusion are further
corollaries of this result.
Next, we illustrate that the VCG outcome may not lie in the core for a general polyhedral
constraint set by revisiting Example 2, and then we illustrate how the conditions in Theorem 5
imply core outcomes in this example.
Example 5 (Power Market) Revisiting Example 2, for the constraint set (2), we highlight that
M is not supermodular: M({A,B,C}) + M({A}) < M({A,B}) + M({A,C}) where M({A}) = 0
and M({A,B,C}) = 0. Then, the VCG outcome under collusion is blocked by a deal between the
operator and bidder 1. Now instead consider the following constraint set:
{x ∈ {0, 100}5 |x1 + x2 + x3 ≥ M˜({A,B}) = 100,
x1 + x4 + x5 ≥ M˜({A,C}) = 100,
x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 ≥ M˜({A,B,C}) = 200}.
7Polymatroid is a polytope associated with a submodular function. We highlight that under the conditions in
Theorem 5, the first set of constraints in (9) is a contra-polymatroid [49].
12
Under this new constraint set, type A can still replace types B and C, but it cannot replace both types
simultaneously. In other words, types B and C cannot complement each other to replace type A as
well. Note that the function M˜ is supermodular, normalized and nondecreasing, which satisfies all
the requirements of Theorem 5. So, here the VCG outcome lies in the core. Specifically, under the
VCG mechanism, bidders 2 and 4 become winners and receive p2 = 350 + (650− 600) = $400 and
p4 = 250 + (750− 600) = $400. This outcome is not blocked by any other coalition and collusion is
not profitable for bidders. This example illustrates that marginally increasing cost curves alone are
not enough to conclude the supermodularity of the reverse auction objective function in (1).
4 Core-Selecting Mechanisms
In this section, we investigate further payment rules that are coalition-proof without any restrictions
on the bidders and the constraint set. In particular, we show that any mechanism that selects its
payments from the core is coalition-proof. Under such mechanisms, losing bidders cannot profit
from a joint deviation, and a shill bidder cannot profit more than its truthful VCG utility.
We first define the core with respect to the submitted bids and refer to it as the revealed core.
Definition 3 For every set of bidders R ⊆ L, the revealed core Core(BR) ∈ R×R|R|+ is defined as
follows
Core(BR) =
{
u¯ ∈ R× R|R|+ | u¯0 +
∑
l∈R
u¯l = −J(BR), u¯0 +
∑
l∈S
u¯l ≥ −J(BS), ∀S ⊂ R
}
. (10)
Next, we define utilities with respect to the submitted bids. The revealed utility of bidder l
is defined by u¯l(B) = pl(B) − bl(x∗l (B)), and the revealed utility of the operator is defined by
u¯0(B) = u0(B) = −
∑
l∈L pl(B)− d(x∗(B), y∗(B)).
A mechanism is said to be core-selecting if it is selecting its payments such that the revealed
utilities lie in the revealed core Core(B). Then, the payment rule is given by
pl(B) = bl(x∗l (B)) + u¯l(B),
where u¯ ∈ Core(B). We highlight that the revealed core can be defined without the true costs. As
a remark, the pay-as-bid mechanism is a core-selecting mechanism where u¯l = 0 for all l ∈ L. Our
main result of this section shows that these mechanisms give rise to coalition-proof outcomes.
Theorem 6 Consider a core-selecting auction mechanism modeled by (1).
(i) A group of bidders who lose when bidding their true values cannot profit by a joint deviation.
(ii) Bidding with multiple identities is unprofitable for all bidders with respect to the VCG utilities.
The proof is relegated to Appendix G. This proof can be used as an alternative approach to
prove Theorem 3. We remark that the proof method differs from Theorem 3 since this proof does
not require supermodularity.
The VCG mechanism is known to be the only dominant-strategy incentive-compatible efficient
mechanism [50]; however, the VCG mechanism can be subject to collusion and shill bidding [51].
We showed that this occurs since the VCG outcomes may not lie in the core and thus incentive-
compatibility property of the VCG mechanism is relaxed under the core-selecting mechanisms [23].
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To alleviate this issue, we investigate the core-selecting mechanisms that minimize bidders’ maxi-
mum gain from a unilateral deviation from truthful bidding. We soon see that these mechanisms
select the revealed utility allocations that are most preferable for the bidders.
A revealed utility allocation u¯ ∈ Core(B) is bidder-Pareto-optimal if there is no u˜ ∈ Core(B)
such that u˜l ≥ u¯l for each l ∈ L, and u˜l > u¯l for some bidder l ∈ L. In Figure 1, the set of
bidder-Pareto-optimal points correspond to the line segment of the core with the maximum total
payment. Nash equilibria of the pay-as-bid mechanism for the market model (1) are also given by
the bidder-Pareto-optimal points in the core with respect to the true costs, see [9, Theorem 1].
It is shown that a core-selecting mechanism minimizes the tendencies to deviate from truthful
bids, among all other core-selecting mechanisms, if and only if the mechanism chooses a bidder-
Pareto-optimal revealed utility allocation [23]. This result follows from the fact that the maximum
gain from a deviation from truthful bidding is given by the difference between the VCG payment
and the core-selecting one [52]. We call such mechanisms bidder optimal core-selecting (BOCS)
mechanisms. From Figure 1, we observe that there are many utility allocations satisfying this
property. To obtain a unique outcome, we select the one that minimizes the Euclidean distance to
the VCG utilities [25]. For a study on alternative bidder optimal core-selecting payment rules, we
refer to [24,53].
We remark that if the VCG outcome lies in the core, then it is the unique bidder-Pareto-optimal
point in the core, see our work in [9]. As a result, the VCG and BOCS mechanisms are equivalent
under the supermodularity condition. If the supermodularity condition holds, truthful bidding
also becomes the dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium of the BOCS mechanism. In Table 2, the
comparisons of the BOCS, VCG and pay-as-bid mechanisms are provided.
Table 2: Comparison of the mechanisms for the reverse auction (1) (? stands for Yes if supermod-
ularity holds)
Property Pay-as-bid BOCS VCG
Incentive-compatibility No ? Yes
Utilities are in the revealed core Yes Yes ?
Coalition-proofness Yes Yes ?
Next, we investigate methods to calculate the BOCS payments. Using our previous results, we
first reduce the problem size significantly. However, this calculation may still be computationally
infeasible for some instances. To this end, we formulate this problem with an iterative approach,
which converges fast in practice.
4.1 Computing payments under the BOCS mechanism
Finding a Pareto-optimal outcome is computationally difficult for auctions involving many bidders,
because one needs to solve the reverse auction problem (1) for 2|L| different subsets to define the core
constraints in (10). Furthermore, the reverse auction problem (1) can be NP-hard in some cases.
Invoking Lemma 1, we can reduce the number of constraints to 2|W |, which grows exponentially
only in the number of winners. We call this approach with the reduced number of core constraints
the direct BOCS approach. Here, we formulate this approach for calculating the BOCS payments.
We start by removing the operator from the definition. By invoking Lemma 1, we keep only the
constraints corresponding to the subsets of the winners. As a result, we have that u¯ ∈ Core(B), if
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and only if u¯0 = −J(B)−
∑
l∈L u¯l and u¯−0 lies in
K(B) =
{
u¯−0 ∈ R|L|+ |
∑
l∈K
u¯l ≤ J(B−K)− J(B),∀K ⊆W
}
. (11)
As we already discussed, there can be multiple bidder-Pareto-optimal core points. We first
maximize the sum of the revealed utilities of the bidders, since such revealed utilities are bidder-
Pareto-optimal, and they are also known to minimize the sum of maximum profits of all bidders by
a deviation from truthful bidding [52]. We can also argue that adopting a total payment maximizing
core-selecting mechanism promotes fairness since it is in the combined best interest of the bidders.
Consequently, BOCS mechanisms maximize the revealed utility of bidders, as follows:
ν = max
u¯−0∈K(B)
1>u¯−0 . (12)
From Figure 1, we observe that the solution u¯∗−0 to (12) may not be unique since there are many
bidder-Pareto-optimal utility maximizing allocations. From this set, we select the point that min-
imizes the Euclidean distance to the VCG outcome,
u¯BOCS−0 = arg min
u¯−0∈K(B),
1>u¯−0=ν
∥∥u¯−0 − u¯VCG−0 ∥∥22 , (13)
where u¯VCGl = J(B−l) − J(B), for all l ∈ L. A winning bidder gets the payment pBOCSl (B) =
bl(x
∗
l (B)) + u¯BOCSl . Taking the VCG revealed utilities as a reference rule is intuitive and one can
choose another utility maximizing allocation by studying the market properties and its partici-
pants [25].
Unfortunately, this approach may still not be a computationally feasible one since there can
be many winners to the reverse auction (1). Therefore, we study iterative approaches where core
constraints are generated on demand.
4.2 Iterative approach via core constraint generation
Because the number of the core constraints in (11) increases exponentially with the number of
winners, we may not be able to enumerate all the core constraints for the reverse auction in (1).
Hence, the BOCS payments could be hard to calculate. As suggested in [52], the state of the
art approach for calculating a core outcome is to use constraint generation and in practice, this
algorithm requires the generation of only several core constraints. The method was initially used
in the 1950s in order to solve linear programs that have too many constraints [54]. Instead of
directly solving the large problem, one solves a primary problem with only a subset of its original
constraints. From this primary solution, one can formulate a secondary problem that adds another
constraint to the first step. The algorithm iterates between these two problems and converges to
the optimal solution of the large problem.
Next, we formulate the core constraint generation algorithm to calculate the BOCS payments
for the reverse auction (1). Previously, this constraint generation method was only formulated for
forward combinatorial auctions [52]. We take into account the conceptual differences of our reverse
auction model in (1).
Bidders’ revealed utilities at the first step of our algorithm are given by u¯0−0 = u¯VCG−0 , where
u¯VCG−0 is the revealed utilities of the VCG mechanism. Convergence of the algorithm does not
require this choice. However, this choice is intuitive since u¯VCG−0 is the solution to (13) if the VCG
outcome lies in the core.
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As an iterative method, at each step k, we find the blocking coalition that has the largest
violation for the revealed utility allocation u¯k−0.8 If a blocking coalition exists, the coalition with
the largest violation for the revealed utility allocation u¯k−0 is given by
Ck = arg min
C⊆L
J(BC) +
∑
l∈C
u¯kl . (14)
This follows from the constraints in Core(B) in (10). Let W be the set of winners. It is straight-
forward to see that the existence of this blocking coalition Ck is equivalent to the violation of
the constraint
∑
l∈W\Ck u¯
k
l ≤ J(BL\{W\Ck}) − J(B) from the set in (11). This follows from the
equivalent characterization of the core in Lemma 1. We call the set W \ Ck the blocked winners,
and the problem (14) generates the core constraint on the revealed utilities of this set of bidders.
Next, we reformulate the problem in (14) using inflated bids. Given a revealed utility allocation
u¯k−0 ∈ R|L|+ , we define the central operator’s objective at step k as
J¯k(x, y;B) =
∑
l∈L
b
u¯kl
l (xl) + d(x, y),
where the inflated bid b
u¯kl
l (xl) ∈ R+ is given by
b
u¯kl
l (xl) =
{
0 xl = 0
bl(xl) + u¯
k
l otherwise.
Note that even if the bid bl is a convex bid curve, the inflated bid b
u¯kl
l is not convex if u¯
k
l 6= 0,
because of the discontinuity at 0. As a remark, the discontinuity at 0 can be described by binary
variables. Then, the optimization problem (14) for finding the blocking coalition with the largest
violation is reformulated as follows
z(u¯k−0) = minx,y J¯
k(x, y;B) s.t. g(x, y) ≤ 0,
x∗(u¯k−0) = arg min
x
{
min
y: g(x,y)≤0
J¯k(x, y;B)
}
,
Ck = {l ∈ L |x∗l (u¯k−0) 6= 0},
(15)
where Ck is the blocking coalition with the largest violation for the revealed utility allocation u¯k−0.
Notice that the problem (15) essentially solves the reverse auction where winners’ bids are inflated
by their revealed utilities from the earlier step.
After obtaining the blocking coalition and the corresponding central operator cost z(u¯k−0), we
solve the following two problems to obtain another candidate for a BOCS revealed utility allocation.
First, we take the subset of revealed utilities that are maximizing the total utility of bidders as
follows
νk = max
u¯−0∈R|L|+
1>u¯−0
s.t.
∑
l∈W\Ct
u¯l ≤ J(BL\{W\Ct})− J(B), ∀t ≤ k,
u¯−0 ≤ u¯VCG−0 ,
(16)
8We remark that the coalition C is a blocking coalition if J(BC) +∑l∈C u¯l < −u¯0, see the constraints in (10).
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where J(BL\{W\Ct}) = z(u¯t−0)−
∑
l∈W∩Ct u¯
t
l . We highlight that this term, J(BL\{W\Ct}), does not
require any further solution to the reverse auction problem. Moreover, the last constraint in (16)
follows from the core constraints since the VCG outcome is the maximal revealed utility in the core
for every bidder [9]. As a result, it is straightforward to see that the problem (16) essentially solves
the problem (12) with only a subset of its original constraints. Then, we determine a new candidate
for the bidders’ revealed utilities, u¯k+1−0 , as the solution to the following quadratic program:
u¯k+1−0 = arg min
u¯−0∈R|L|+
∥∥u¯−0 − u¯VCG−0 ∥∥22
s.t.
∑
l∈W\Ct
u¯l ≤ J(BL\{W\Ct})− J(B), ∀t ≤ k,
u¯−0 ≤ u¯VCG−0 , 1>u¯−0 = νk.
(17)
The entire process for determining the bidder optimal core-selecting payment is summarized in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Core Constraint Generation (CCG) Algorithm
Initialize: Solve the optimization problem (1). Calculate the VCG utilities and set u¯0 = u¯VCG
and k = 0.
1: Solve the optimization problem (15).
2: while W \ Ck 6= ∅ do
3: Obtain u¯k+1−0 by solving (16) and then (17).
4: Update k = k + 1.
5: Solve the optimization problem (15).
6: end while
7: return u¯k−0.
Algorithm 1 converges to the solution of the optimization problem (13) for the BOCS mecha-
nism. We refer to [52, Theorem 4.2] for the proof of convergence of this algorithm. We note that
this algorithm may still require the generation of all possible core constraints, which is equivalent to
solving the problem (15) 2|W | times. In practice, even when there are many winners, the algorithm
requires the generation of only several core constraints. Using this approach, we can significantly
reduce the number of solutions needed for the optimization problem (1) in order to calculate the
BOCS payments.
5 Numerical Results
Our goal is to compare the effectiveness of the proposed mechanisms and methods based on electric-
ity market data. Towards this we consider the pay-as-bid, the LMP, the BOCS, and the VCG mech-
anisms. First, we consider an optimal power dispatch problem with a four-node three-generator
network and show that the VCG outcomes are not coalition-proof. Then, we illustrate the coalition-
proof outcomes obtained by the BOCS mechanism. Second, we consider the IEEE test systems. We
compare the total payment under the LMP, the BOCS, and the VCG mechanisms. We verify that
the VCG outcomes are in the core for the considered instances. Then, with small modifications to
the line limits, we show that the VCG outcomes do not necessarily lie in the core for these test
systems as well. Finally, we study the two-stage Swiss reserve procurement auction [6]. We show
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that the VCG outcomes are not in the core, hence shill bidding and collusion can be profitable for
the bidders.
In order to illustrate the applicability of the BOCS mechanism, we provide the wall-clock
time for the computations performed using our setup. We solve all optimization problems with
GUROBI [55], called through MATLAB via YALMIP [56], on a computer equipped with a 32 GB
RAM and a 4.0 GHz quad-core Intel i7 processor.
5.1 Four-node three-generator network model
We consider a dispatch problem with polytopic DC power flow constraints in Figure 3, based on
the models considered in [10]. Cost curves are quadratic polynomials. All lines have the same
susceptance. In Figure 3, line limit from node i to node j is denoted by Ci,j = Cj,i ∈ R+. Under
the VCG mechanism, payments and utilities are given in the first column of Table 3. Suppose via
coalition bidders 1 and 2 change their bids to bl(x) = 0 for all x ∈ R+. Then, bidders 1 and 2 are
the only winners of the dispatch problem and their payments and utilities are given in the second
column of Table 3. Collusion is profitable and the total payment of the operator increases from
$260 to $280.
C3,2 = 10 MW
C3,1 = 10 MW
C1,2 = 10 MW
C1,4 = 10 MW
C2,4 = 10 MW
2
1
3 4
G2 c2(x) = .1x
2 + 12x
G1 c1(x) = .1x
2 + 12x
G3c3(x) = .1x
2 + 5x D D = 20 MWh
Figure 3: Four-node three-generator network
Table 3: The VCG outcomes for the network model ($, MWh)
Truthful Bidding Collusion (1, 2)
payment (utility) x payment (utility) x
Bidder 1 0 (0) 0 140 (10) 10
Bidder 2 0 (0) 0 140 (10) 10
Bidder 3 260 (120) 20 0 (0) 0
Next, we consider the BOCS mechanism. Under the BOCS mechanism, payments and utilities
are given in the first column of Table 4. Suppose, via coalition, bidders 1 and 2 change their bids
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to bl(x) = 0 for all x ∈ Rt+. Then, bidders 1 and 2 are the only winners of the dispatch problem
and their payments and utilities are given in the second column of Table 4. We observe that the
collective utility of bidders 1 and 2 reduces to −$120. Hence, in this case, collusion is not profitable
for bidders 1 and 2. Furthermore, after the collusion, the total payment of the operator also reduces
from $260 to $140. This example shows that the core-selecting mechanisms can eliminate collusion
of the losing bidders.
Table 4: The BOCS outcomes for the network model ($, MWh)
Truthful Bidding Collusion (1, 2)
payment (utility) x payment (utility) x
Bidder 1 0 (0) 0 70 (−60) 10
Bidder 2 0 (0) 0 70 (−60) 10
Bidder 3 260 (120) 20 0 (0) 0
5.2 IEEE test systems with DC power flow models
The following simulations are based on the IEEE test systems with polytopic DC power flow
constraints adopting the models considered in [10].
5.2.1 14-bus, 30-bus and 118-bus test systems
We consider the IEEE 14-bus [57], 30-bus [58, 59] and 118-bus test systems [57]. We assume all
bidders are truthful and the true cost curves are convex quadratic polynomials, provided in the
references. In practice, truthfulness can only hold under the VCG mechanism since it is dominant-
strategy incentive-compatible. The corresponding total payments of the mechanisms are shown in
Table 5. All the mechanisms lead to the same winner allocation as expected.
Table 5: Total payments of the IEEE test systems
Mechanism 14-bus 30-bus 118-bus
Pay-as-bid $7642.6 $565.2 $125947.8
LMP $10105.1 $716.9 $167055.8
BOCS $10513.4 $746.4 $169300.4
VCG $10513.4 $746.4 $169300.4
For all three test systems, we observe that the VCG mechanism has a slightly larger total
payment than the LMP mechanism. Moreover, the VCG payment of every bidder is larger than its
LMP payment. For the DC power flow models with increasing convex bids, this result was proven
in [15, Theorem 2].
Another observation is that the VCG outcomes are in the core for all systems. Next, we provide
an explanation for each system. 14-bus and 118-bus systems do not have any line limits, hence,
they have the form of (8). Invoking Theorem 4, we conclude that supermodularity condition holds.
Despite the fact that 30-bus system has line limits, the VCG outcome is in the core. This result
can be explained in two ways. First, none of the line limit constraints are tight. Second, we observe
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that removing two bidders can yield to an infeasible problem, similar to Proposition 1. These test
systems are specialized instances and they do not necessarily conclude that the VCG mechanism is
coalition-proof for the DC power flow models. We examine this shortcoming of the VCG mechanism
in our next simulation.
Computation times are provided only for the 118-bus case, because the other problems are triv-
ially small. For this electricity market, the direct BOCS approach is not computationally feasible,
because there are 19 winners out of 54 bidders and the optimal cost calculation takes 451 millisec-
onds. This approach would require 66 hours. Computation times for the VCG mechanism and
the CCG algorithm are 24.8 and 31.4 seconds respectively. After the VCG mechanism, the CCG
algorithm converges only in a single iteration. This iteration takes 6.6 seconds, because it involves
binary variables whereas the optimal cost calculation for the market model does not.
5.2.2 Effect of line limits
We consider the IEEE 14-bus test system, with a line limit on lines exiting node 1, connecting
node 1 to nodes 2 and 5. We set this line limit to be 10 MW. We again assume all bidders are
truthful. The corresponding total payments of the mechanisms are shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Total payments of the IEEE 14-bus test system with line limits
Mechanism 14-bus with line limits
Pay-as-bid $9715.2
LMP $10361.0
BOCS $11220.1
VCG $11432.1
We observe that the VCG outcome does not lie in the core. Line limits are tight and the
problem does not have the form of (8). Hence, shill bidding and collusion can be profitable for
bidders. Moreover, we observe that the BOCS mechanism yields a larger total payment than
the LMP mechanism. We underline that this does not necessarily hold for the payment of a
single bidder, because the BOCS payment depends on the Pareto-optimal point chosen. For some
bidders, the BOCS payment can be equal to the pay-as-bid payment (which is smaller than the
LMP payment), whereas for some others it can be equal to the VCG payment (which is larger than
the LMP payment).
With this result, we also reiterate that convex bid curves are not enough to ensure that the
VCG outcomes are in the core. Similar results can be obtained for 118-bus test system by fixing
50 MW limits on two lines, one connecting nodes 5 and 6, another connecting nodes 9 and 10.
For the 14-bus example, computation times for the VCG mechanism and the CCG algorithm
are 3.6 and 8.2 seconds respectively. After the VCG mechanism, the CCG algorithm converges in
4 iterations.
5.3 Swiss reserve procurement auctions
The following simulations are based on the bids placed in the 46th weekly Swiss reserve procurement
auction of 2014 [6]. The reverse auction involves 21 power plants bidding for secondary reserves,
25 for positive tertiary and 21 for negative tertiary reserves. There are complex constraints arising
from nonlinear cumulative distribution functions. The constraints imply that the deficit of reserves
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cannot occur with a probability higher than 0.2%. Moreover, the constraints include coupling
between first and second stage decision variables corresponding to the weekly and daily reserve
auctions. The corresponding total payments and procured MWs of the pay-as-bid mechanism, the
BOCS mechanism, and the VCG mechanism are shown in Table 7.
Table 7: Total payments of the two stage auction
Type SR PTR NTR
Procured MWs 409 MW 100 MW 114 MW
Total Pay-as-bid payment 2.293 million CHF
Total BOCS payment 2.437 million CHF
Total VCG payment 2.529 million CHF
While the VCG payment rule yields the highest total payment, the BOCS yields the second
highest. Note that the bids from the power plants are not marginally nondecreasing for all quantities
and the constraints are nonstandard. Hence, the supermodularity condition does not hold and we
observe that the VCG outcome does not lie in the core. Consequently, shill bidding and collusion
are profitable for bidders under the VCG mechanism.
For this electricity market, the direct BOCS approach is not computationally feasible, because
there are 28 winners and the optimal cost calculation takes 8 seconds. This approach would require
68 years. Computation times for the VCG mechanism and the CCG algorithm are 580.6 and
659.2 seconds respectively. After the VCG mechanism, the CCG algorithm converges in 4 iterations.
6 Conclusion
We introduced a constrained optimization problem to model reverse auctions that may involve
continuous values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage
costs. We discussed the game theoretic analysis of these reverse auction mechanisms under different
payment rules. We first showed that the VCG mechanism results in a dominant-strategy incentive-
compatible Nash equilibrium. Through examples, we then showed that this mechanism suffers from
collusion and shill bidding. Motivated by this problem, we derived three different conditions under
which collusion and shill bidding are not profitable, and hence the VCG mechanism is coalition-
proof. Since these conditions are restrictive and they may not capture the constrained optimization
problem under consideration, we investigated the closest we can achieve to the property of incentive-
compatibility under a coalition-proof mechanism. To this end, we formulated the bidder optimal
core-selecting mechanism. By removing incentives for manipulations, we expect the bidding process
to be simplified, and this can help promote participation in the market. Finally, we verified our
results in several case studies based on electricity market data.
As a future work, we will explore learning Nash equilibria in such markets to model the behavior
of the bidders in a repeated setting. As an extension, we will consider budget balance in double-
sided auctions. Also, we will address the issue of pricing intermittent generation.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof (i) We distinguish between bidder l placing a generic bid Bl = bl and bidding truthfully
Cl = cl. For the set of bids B, the utility of bidder l is given by:
ul(B) = h(B−l) −
(∑
k 6=l
bk(x
∗
k(B)) + cl(x∗l (B)) + d(x∗(B), y∗(B))
)
,
where the term in brackets is the cost J¯ of Cˆ = (Cl,B−l) but evaluated at (x∗(B), y∗(B)), see (1).
For Cˆ note that ul(Cˆ) = h(B−l)− J(Cˆ). Then, we have the following:
J(Cˆ) ≤
∑
k 6=l
bk(x
∗
k(B)) + cl(x∗l (B)) + d(x∗(B), y∗(B)).
We can show that ul(Cˆ) ≥ ul(B) because (x∗(B), y∗(B)) is a feasible suboptimal allocation for the
auction under the bids Cˆ. Therefore, bidding truthfully is a best response strategy, regardless of
other bidders’ strategies B−l.
(ii) By the definition of VCG payment rule and incentive-compatibility, we have pl(C) = ul(C)+
cl(x
∗
l (C)) where C = {cl}l∈L. We then have: u0(C) = −
∑
l∈L cl(x
∗
l (C))−d(x∗(C), y∗(C))−
∑
l∈L ul(C).
The sum of utilities,
∑|L|
l=0 ul(C) = −
∑
l∈L cl(x
∗
l (C))−d(x∗(C), y∗(C)) is maximized since (x∗(C), y∗(C))
is the minimizer to the optimization problem (1) under true costs.
(iii) Nonnegative payments can be verified substituting Clarke pivot rule for h(B−l):
pl(B) = bl(x∗l (B)) + (J(B−l)− J(B)) ≥ 0,
for all set of bids B. For individual rationality, assume bidders are not bidding less than their true
costs, that is, bl(x) ≥ cl(x), ∀x ∈ Rt+. We have
ul(B) = bl(x∗l (B))− cl(x∗l (B)) + J(B−l)− J(B) ≥ 0,
for all set of bids B. 
B Proof of Lemma 1
Proof The utility allocation u is unblocked by every S ⊆ L if and only if
−J(CS) ≤
∑
l∈S
ul + u0 =
∑
l∈S
ul −
∑
l∈W
ul − J(C), ∀S ⊆ L,
since the losing bidders are not allocated and they obtain zero payment. Thus, the core can equiva-
lently be parametrized as ∑
l∈W\S
ul ≤ J(CS)− J(C), ∀S ⊆ L.
Moreover, fixing the set K = W \ S, the dominant constraints are those corresponding to minimal
J(CS), in particular, when we have S = L \K (this being maximal set with K not taking part in
the coalition S). 
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C Proof of Theorem 2
Proof We prove that supermodularity is sufficient for uVCG to lie in the core, Core(CR), for all
R ⊆ L. Notice that we have uVCGl,R = J(CR\l)− J(CR), we drop the dependence on R for the sake of
simplicity in notation. We recall Lemma 1. Hence, we need to show that∑
l∈K
ul ≤ J(CR\K)− J(CR), ∀K ⊆W. (18)
Let K = {l1, . . . , lk}. Notice that, by supermodularity, J(CR\lκ) − J(CR) ≤ J(CR\{lκ,...,lk}) −
J(CR\{lκ+1,...,lk}). Thus ∑
l∈K
uVCGl =
k∑
κ=1
J(CR\lκ)− J(CR)
≤
k∑
κ=1
J(CR\{lκ,...,lk})− J(CR\{lκ+1,...,lk})
= J(CR\K)− J(CR).
The last equality holds by a telescoping sum. Thus, we see that (18) holds and so, by Lemma 1,
the VCG outcome belongs to the core. The same argument can be repeated to obtained core VCG
outcomes for any set of participating auction bidders R ⊆ L and for any profile C.
To prove that supermodularity is also necessary for outcomes to lie in the core, we proceed by
contradiction. Suppose that the supermodularity condition does not hold for a bidder l. Then, there
exist sets S ⊆ R where J(CR\l)−J(CR)>J(CS\l)−J(CS). We may, without loss of generality, choose
R = S ∪ {i} for some i. To see this, take S0 = S and Sκ = Sκ−1 ∪ {lκ} with Sk = R, then,
k∑
κ=1
J(CSκ\l)− J(CSκ−1\l) = J(CR\l)− J(CS\l)
> J(CR)− J(CS) =
k∑
κ=1
J(CSκ)− J(CSκ−1).
The strict inequality above must hold for one of the summands J(CSκ\l) − J(CSκ−1\l) > J(CSκ) −
J(CSκ−1). So we may consider sets S ⊆ R that differ by one bidder, say i. Thus, by this observation,
we have J(CR\l) − J(CR) > J(CS\l) − J(CS) = J(CR\{i,l}) − J(CR\i) for i ∈ R \ S. Further, after
rearranging the above inequality we obtain
J(CR\i)− J(CR) > J(CR\{i,l})− J(CR\l) ≥ 0. (19)
That is, both bidder i and l are winners of the VCG auction with bidders R. Considering the
auction with the set of bidders R and with i, l ∈W , and K = {i, l}, we have:∑
l′∈K
uVCGl′ =
∑
l′∈K
J(CR\l′)− J(CR)
=J(CR\{i})− J(CR) + J(CR\l)− J(CR)
>J(CR\{i,l})− J(CR\l) + J(CR\l)− J(CR)
=J(CR\K)− J(CR),
where in the inequality above we apply (19). Thus, given Lemma 1, (18) does not hold, consequently,
uVCG /∈ Core(CR). Thus the outcome of the VCG mechanism is not in the core for the subset of
bidders R ⊆ L. 
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D Proof of Theorem 3
Proof (i) Let K be a set of colluders who would lose the auction when bidding their true values
CK = {cl}l∈K , when bidding BK = {bl}l∈K they become winners, that is, they are all allocated a
positive quantity. We define C = (CK , C−K) and B = (BK , C−K) where C−K = {cl}l∈L\K denotes the
bidding profile of the remaining bidders. As a remark, the profile C−K is not necessarily a truthful
profile. The VCG utility that each player l in K receives under B is
uVCGl (B) ≤ uVCGl (B−l, Cl)
= J(B−l)− J(B−l, Cl)
≤ J(C−K)− J(C−K , Cl)
= J(C−l)− J(C)
= uVCGl (C)
= 0,
where the first inequality follows from the dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility of the VCG
mechanism. The first equality comes from the definition of the VCG mechanism and the second
inequality applies the supermodularity of the function J . The next equality comes from the fact that
the set K originally was a group of losers.
So we see that, for all l ∈ K, the utility uVCGl (B) is upper bounded by the utility that bidder
l would receive if every colluder was bidding truthfully. However, by the initial assumption, these
bidders were losers while bidding truthfully, and hence uVCGl (C) = 0, for all l ∈ K. Thus there is
no benefit for losers from colluding by jointly deviating from their truthful bids.
(ii) Similar to part (i), define C = (C−l, Cl). The profile C−l is not necessarily a truthful profile.
Shill bids of bidder l are given by BS = {bk}k∈S. We define a merged bid B˜l as
b˜l(xl) = min
xk∈Rt+,∀k
∑
k∈S
bk(xk) s.t.
∑
k∈S
xk = xl.
We then define B˜ = (C−l, B˜l). The VCG utility from shill bidding under B = (C−l,BS),
∑
k∈S u
VCG
k (B),
is given by
=
∑
k∈S
[J(B−k)− J(B) + bk(x∗k(B))]− cl(
∑
k∈S
x∗k(B))
≤ [J(B−S)− J(B)] +
∑
k∈S
bk(x
∗
k(B))− cl(
∑
k∈S
x∗k(B))
= [J(C−l)− J(B˜)] + b˜l(
∑
k∈S
x∗k(B))− cl(
∑
k∈S
x∗k(B))
= uVCGl (B˜)
≤ uVCGl (C)
The first inequality follows from the supermodularity of J . The second equality holds since we have
J(B˜) = J(B). This follows from the definition of the merged bid and the following implication.
Since the goods of the same type are fungible for the central operator, the functions g and d in
fact depend on
∑
l∈L xl. The third equality follows from the definition of VCG utility. The second
inequality is the dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility of the VCG mechanism. Therefore, the
total VCG utility that l receives from shill bidding is upper bounded by the utility that l would receive
by bidding truthfully as a single bidder. Making use of shills, hence, is not profitable.

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E Proof of Theorem 4
To prove Theorem 4, the following lemma is needed.
Lemma 2 Under the market model (8), for an auction with bidders S and R = S ∪ {j} with
corresponding allocations x and x′, marginally increasing costs imply that ∀l ∈ S, x′l ≤ xl.
Proof The proof follows by contradiction. That is, we will show that when x′ is such that x′l > xl,
for some l ∈ S, then x′ can be modified to provide a lower cost via the allocation q for bidders S
(thus contradicting optimality of x). First, we notice that since bids are equally spaced by the
amount m and with marginally increasing cost,
∑
l∈S xl =
∑
l∈R x
′
l = M holds. Now, in order to
procure exactly M amount from bidders R, some bidders’ allocations must decrease, that is, the set
K = {l ∈ S |x′l < xl} is nonempty. Consider a feasible allocation q′ for the auction with bidders R
where the amount M is being procured and
q′l =

x′j , for l = j,
xl, for l ∈ S\K,
q′l, for l ∈ K where x′l ≤ q′l ≤ xl.
So, q′ is constructed from x′ by transferring the amount m′ =
∑
l∈S\K x
′
l − xl from bidders in
S\K to bidders in K. In doing so, the inequality x′l ≤ q′l ≤ xl can be maintained:
m′ ≤
∑
l∈K
(xl − x′l).
The above inequality holds because when summing over l ∈ S, xl’s sum to M and x′l’s sum to
M − xj.
Since x′ is optimal for bidders R and q′ is not:
J(CR) =cj(x′j) +
∑
l∈S\K
cl(x
′
l) +
∑
l∈K
cl(x
′
l)
≤cj(x′j) +
∑
l∈S\K
cl(xl) +
∑
l∈K
cl(q
′
l) = J¯(q
′), (20)
where we used J¯(q′) as a short-hand-notation for the cost corresponding to choosing the allocation q′
under truthful bidding.
Now, we use the marginally increasing true costs to replace the summations over K in (20). In
particular, define q = (ql : l ∈ S) so that
ql := xl + (x
′
l − q′l) =
{
x′l for l ∈ S\K,
xl + x
′
l − q′l for l ∈ K.
Note that q is feasible since x′ and q′ have the same sum over S (and thus cancel) and xl is feasible.
Further, since (ql − xl) = (x′l − q′l),∑
l∈K
cl(ql)− cl(x′l) <
∑
l∈K
cl(xl)− cl(q′l). (21)
Adding (21) to both side of (20) (and canceling cj(x
′
j)) gives
J¯(q) =
∑
l∈S\K
cl(x
′
l) +
∑
l∈K
cl(ql)
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<
∑
l∈S\K
cl(xl) +
∑
l∈K
cl(xl) = J(CS),
which contradicts the optimality of x. 
Corollary 1 Given the conditions in Theorem 4 and the optimal allocation to procure the amount
M , for any lower amount M˜ ≤M(while being multiple of m) to be procured, the allocation for each
bidder does not increase.
This corollary follows from Lemma 2. Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 4.
Proof We prove that J is supermodular. We adopt the same notation used in Lemma 2 and we
identify with W ⊆ S the set of winners. For each l /∈ W , we have by definition xl = 0. Thus
0 = J(CS\l) − J(CS), (since the optimal solution is unchanged when l is removed from S). By
Lemma 2, x′l = 0 and so 0 = J(CR\l)− J(CR) also. Thus, supermodularity holds for l /∈W .
For each winning bidder w ∈ W , denote uVCGw (CS) = J(CS\w) − J(CS). Adopting the same
notation of Lemma 2, we can indicate it as:
uVCGw (CS) := −cw(xw) +
∑
l∈S−w
(cl(%l)− cl(xl)),
where %l are the optimal allocations of each l ∈ S−w, when w exits the auction. By Lemma 2,
%l ≥ xl. Similarly, after bidder i enters the auction, uVCGw (CR) = J(CR\w)− J(CR). That is,
uVCGw (CR) := −cw(x′w) +
∑
l∈S−w
(cl(%
′
l)− cl(x′l)) + ci(%′i)− ci(x′i),
where %′i are the amounts accepted from l ∈ R−w when w exits the new auction. By Lemma 2, we
again have %′l ≥ x′l.
Notice that so far we applied Lemma 2 to justify the increase of the accepted amounts, first,
from each l ∈ S−w and now from l ∈ R−w, due to the exit of w from the auctions. We can apply
Lemma 2 again and affirm that x′l ≤ xl ∀l ∈ S, and in particular x′w ≤ xw, because of the entrance
of i.
We now find suitable lower and upper bounds to ensure inequality uVCGw (CR) ≤ uVCGw (CS). First,
note that J(CS) =
∑
l∈S−w cl(xl)+cw(xw) ≤
∑
l∈S−w cl(ql)+cw(x
′
w), where ql’s are from the cheapest
allocation to procure the amount (M − x′w) among S−w. By Lemma 2 we have %l ≥ ql ≥ xl ∀l ∈
S−w, since xl’s sum to (M − xw) ≤ (M − x′w) (due to x′w ≤ xw), and %l’s sum to M . Moreover,
since every cl is marginally increasing, ql’s are such that
∑
l∈S−w(%l − ql) = x′w, because exactly
the amount M is purchased. Using the above suboptimal allocation, we have a lower bound for
uVCGw (CS):
uVCGw (CS) ≥
∑
l∈S−w
(cl(%l)− cl(ql))− cw(x′w). (22)
Defining now δl = (%l−ql),∀l ∈ S−w we must have
∑
l∈S−w δl = x
′
w and J(CR\w) =
∑
l∈S−w cl(%
′
l)+
ci(%
′
i) ≤
∑
l∈S−w cl(x
′
l + δl) + ci(x
′
i) , since the right hand side is a feasible cost to procure the
amount M among the bidders {S, i} \ w. Indeed, ∑l∈S x′l + x′i = M and ∑l∈S−w δl = x′w. Hence,
we have:
uVCGw (CR) ≤
∑
l∈S−w
(cl(x
′
l + δl)− cl(x′l)) + (ci(x′i)− ci(x′i))− cw(x′w).
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Moreover, via marginally increasing costs (also via strictly convex costs), we have:
(cl(x
′
l + δl)− cl(x′l)) ≤ (cl(%l)− cl(ql)), ∀l ∈ S−w. (23)
The above holds because ∀l ∈ S−w, (%l − ql) = (x′l + δl − x′l) = δl and x′l ≤ ql. In particular, x′l
are the amounts accepted to procure the amount (M − x′w) among {S, i} \ w, while ql are those to
procure the same amount among S−w. Then, combining equations (23) and (22), we finally obtain
uVCGw (CR) ≤ uVCGw (CS). As a result, we obtain supermodularity and this concludes the proof. 
F Proof of Theorem 5
Proof We prove that J is supermodular. To this end, we reparametrize the problem (9) into
another class of optimization problem. We define the function f : 2L → R+ as follows
f(A) = max
∀T⊆{1,...,t},
A⊇AT
M(T ).
We consider the following optimization problem:
J(CS) = min
x∈R|L|+
∑
l∈S
cl(xl)
s.t.
∑
l∈A
xl ≥ f(A), ∀A ⊆ L,
xl ≤ X¯l, ∀l ∈ L,
xl = 0, ∀l ∈ L \ S.
(24)
First, notice that f(AT ) = M(T ). Since xl ≥ 0, ∀l, the constraints added by the definition of
the function f are all redundant constraints. Then, these constraints in (24) are feasible, once the
constraints in (9) are satisfied. Hence, these problems are equivalent. We also remark that f(∅) = 0
and f is nondecreasing.
Before we proceed, we need to show that supermodularity of the function M implies supermod-
ularity of the function f . Suppose f(A) = M(TA) and f(B) = M(TB) for some TA, TB. Then,
f(A) + f(B) =M(TA) +M(TB)
≤M(TA ∪ TB) +M(TA ∩ TB)
≤ f(A ∪B) + f(A ∩B).
First inequality follows from supermodularity of the function M . The last inequality holds since
these sets are feasible suboptimums for f(A ∪ B) and f(A ∩ B). We conclude that the function f
is supermodular.
Note that, given supermodularity of the function f , the first set of constraints in (24) defines
a contra-polymatroid, see [49, Section 44] for a detailed exposition. This class of problems are
important in combinatorial optimization because they can often be solved in polynomial time. For
the proof, we extend the work in [60] on replenishment games to reverse auctions over contra-
polymatroids and box constraints.
We first show that the constraint
∑
l∈L xl = f(L) is redundant and can be added to the original
constraint set. We denote Sc = L \ S and denote x∗ as the optimal allocation for (24). It can be
shown that for every x∗k, k ∈ S , there exists a set k ∈ Ak ⊆ L such that
∑
l∈Ak x
∗
l = f(Ak) is tight
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at the optimal solution. We can prove this via contradiction. Assume, for x∗k, k ∈ S, there does
not exist a set k ∈ Ak ⊆ L such that
∑
l∈Ak x
∗
l ≥ f(Ak) is tight. Then, one can simply decrease the
value of x∗k and get a lower objective value. Furthermore, note that any constraint corresponding
to A 6⊃ Sc is redundant to A ∪ Sc because f is nondecreasing and xl = 0, for all l ∈ Sc. Then, this
set Ak has to be a superset of S
c, Ak ⊃ Sc.
Next, we show that if the constraints for A and B are tight, so is the constraint for A ∪B.
f(A ∪B) + f(A ∩B) ≥ f(A) + f(B) (25a)
=
∑
l∈A
x∗l +
∑
l∈B
x∗l (25b)
=
∑
l∈A∪B
x∗l +
∑
l∈A∩B
x∗l (25c)
≥ f(A ∪B) + f(A ∩B). (25d)
Inequality (25a) follows from supermodularity of f , f(A ∪ B) − f(A) ≥ f(B) − f(A ∩ B). Equal-
ity (25b) follows from A and B being tight. We arranged the terms in the equality (25c). Inequal-
ity (25d) follows from the feasibility of x∗ for the problem in (24). Then, it is easy to see that (25d)
is in fact an equality and we can conclude that
∑
l∈A∪B x
∗
l = f(A ∪B).
Recall that the constraint corresponding to the set Al ⊃ Sc ∪ {l} is tight for x∗l . Hence, we can
conclude that the constraint corresponding to the set
⋃
l∈S Al = L is also tight and
∑
l∈L x
∗
l = f(L)
holds for optimal solution.
Next, we reformulate the first set of constraints in (24) as follows.
P =
{
x ∈ R+ | − f(A) ≥
∑
l∈Ac
xl −
∑
l∈L
xl, ∀A ⊆ L
}
. (26)
Define h(A) = −f(Ac) where h(∅) = −f(L) = −∑l∈L xl and reorganize the constraint set (26).
P =
{
x ∈ R+ |h(Ac) +
∑
l∈L
xl ≥
∑
l∈Ac
xl, ∀A ⊆ L
}
=
{
x ∈ R+ |h(A) +
∑
l∈L
xl ≥
∑
l∈A
xl, , ∀A ⊆ L
}
=
{
x ∈ R+ |h(A)− h(∅) ≥
∑
l∈A
xl, ∀A ⊆ L, h(∅) = −
∑
l∈L
xl
}
.
We see that k(A) = h(A) − h(∅) is a nondecreasing submodular function and it is normalized. In
literature, the function k is called a rank function [49]. Note that, k(S) = h(S) − h(∅) = −g(L \
S) + g(L). From the feasibility of the problem (24), we have that g(L \S) = 0 and k(S) = ∑l∈L xl.
We reorganize the constraint set and obtain the following:
P =
{
x ∈ R+ |
∑
l∈A
xl ≤ k(A), ∀A ⊆ L, k(S) =
∑
l∈L
xl
}
.
Finally, given that k is nondecreasing and xl = 0, ∀l ∈ L \ S, we can show that the constraints
corresponding to A ⊃ S are all redundant upper bounds. Then, we obtain the following
P =
{
x ∈ R+ |
∑
l∈A
xl ≤ k(A), ∀A ⊆ S, k(S) =
∑
l∈S
xl
}
.
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The following result is known, and we refer to [61, Theorem 6.1] and [62]. The set P ∩ {x |xl ≤
X¯l, ∀l} is equivalent to the set,
P ′ =
{
x ∈ R+ |
∑
l∈A
xl ≤ f¯(A), ∀A ⊆ S, k(S) =
∑
l∈S
xl
}
,
where f¯(A) = minB⊆A{k(A \ B) +
∑
l∈B X¯l} and this function is also a rank function [61]. We
also assert that f¯(S) = k(S). To see that:
k(S) =
∑
l∈S
xl =
∑
l∈S\B
xl +
∑
l∈B
xl
≤ k(S \B) +
∑
l∈B
X¯l, ∀B ⊆ S,
hence, f¯(S) = minB⊆S{k(S \B) +
∑
l∈B X¯l} = k(S). Finally, we obtain the following
−J(CS) = max
xl∈R+,∀l∈S
∑
l∈S
−cl(xl)
s.t.
∑
l∈A
xl ≤ f¯(A), ∀A ⊆ S,∑
l∈S
xl = f¯(S).
(27)
The first set of constraints in (27) defines a polymatroid, see [49, Section 44]. In [60, Theo-
rem 3], it is proven that maximizing a separable concave function over a polymatroid results in a
submodular objective function. The result also directly includes optimizing over the base polyma-
troid where the polymatroid constraint set is intersected with the equality
∑
l∈S xl = f¯(S). Then,
invoking this result, we conclude that −J is submodular, and J is supermodular. 
G Proof of Theorem 6
First, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Let u¯ ∈ R × R|L|+ be a revealed utility allocation in Core(B). Then, for every set of
bidders K ⊆ L we have ∑l∈K u¯l(B) ≤ J(B−K)− J(B).
Proof Since u¯0 = −J(B) −
∑
l∈L u¯l, we reorganize the inequality constraint as follows −J(B) −∑
l∈L\S u¯l ≥ −J(BS), ∀S ⊆ L. Setting K = L \ S yields the statement. 
Next, we prove that core-selecting mechanisms are coalition-proof.
Proof (i) Let K be a set of colluders who would lose the auction when bidding their true values
Cl = cl, when bidding Bl = bl they become winners, that is, they are all allocated a positive quantity.
We define Cˆ = (CK ,B−K) and B = (BK ,B−K) where B−K = {bl}l∈L\K denotes the bidding profile
of the remaining bidders. As a remark, the profile B−K is not necessarily a truthful or a strategic
profile. We denote the utility that each bidder l receives as ul. The total utility that colluders receive
under B is∑
l∈K
ul(B) =
∑
l∈K
u¯l(B) + bl(x∗l (B))− cl(x∗l (B))
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≤ J(B−K)− J(B) +
∑
l∈K
bl(x
∗
l (B))− cl(x∗l (B))
= J(Cˆ)−
[∑
l∈L
bl(x
∗
l (B)) + d(x∗(B), y∗(B))−
∑
l∈K
bl(x
∗
l (B)) +
∑
l∈K
cl(x
∗
l (B))
]
= J(Cˆ)−
[∑
l∈K
cl(x
∗
l (B)) +
∑
l∈L\K
bl(x
∗
l (B)) + d(x∗(B), y∗(B))
]
≤ 0 =
∑
l∈K
ul(Cˆ).
The first equality follows from the core-selecting payment rule, where u¯(B) is the revealed utility
allocation. The first inequality follows from Lemma 3. The second equality comes from the fact
that the set K originally was a group of losers, so J(B−K) = J(Cˆ). After substituting these terms,
we see that the term in brackets is the cost J¯ of Cˆ but evaluated at a feasible suboptimal allocation
(x∗(B), y∗(B)). Then, ∑l∈K ul(B) is upper bounded by 0 which is the total utility that the colluders
would receive bidding truthfully.
As a result, there is at least one colluder not facing any benefit in collusion. Moreover, they
cannot increase their collective utility by a joint deviation. Hence, collusion is not profitable for the
losing bidders.
(ii) Define C = (C−l, Cl), where C−l denotes the bidding profile of the remaining bidders. The
profile C−l is not necessarily a truthful profile. Shill bids of bidder l are given by BS = {bk}k∈S. We
define a merged bid B˜l as
b˜l(xl) = min
xk∈Rt+,∀k
∑
k∈S
bk(xk) s.t.
∑
k∈S
xk = xl.
We then define B˜ = (C−l, B˜l). The total utility obtained from shill bidding under B = (C−l,BS),∑
k∈S uk(B), is given by
=
∑
k∈S
[u¯k(B) + bk(x∗k(B))]− cl(
∑
k∈S
x∗k(B))
≤ [J(B−S)− J(B)] +
∑
k∈S
bk(x
∗
k(B))− cl(
∑
k∈S
x∗k(B))
= [J(C−l)− J(B˜)] + b˜l(
∑
k∈S
x∗k(B))− cl(
∑
k∈S
x∗k(B))
= uVCGl (B˜)
≤ uVCGl (C)
The first inequality follows from the core-selecting payment rule and Lemma 3. The second equality
holds since we have J(B˜) = J(B). This follows from the definition of the merged bid and the
following implication. Since the goods of the same type are fungible for the central operator, the
functions g and d in fact depend on
∑
l∈L xl. The third equality follows from the definition of the
VCG utility. The second inequality is the dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility of the VCG
mechanism. Therefore, the total utility that l receives from shill bidding is upper bounded by the
utility that l would receive by bidding truthfully as a single bidder in a VCG auction. Making use
of shills, hence, is not profitable with respect to the VCG utilities. 
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